05/10/2023
I
THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY
OF THE QUESTION OF BEING
The Necessity for Explicitfy Restating the Question of Being
THIS question has today been forgotten. Even though in our time we
deem it progressive to give our approval to 'metaphysics' again, it is held
that we have been exempted from the exertions of a newly rekindled
Yet the question we are touching upon is not just
any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of
Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme for actual
investigation.1 What these two men achieved was to persist through many
alterations and 'retouchings' down to the 'logic' of Hegel. And what
they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena,
fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become
trivialized.
Not only that. On the basis of the Greeks' initial contributions towards
an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has been developed which not only
declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but
sanctions its complete neglect. It is said that 'Being' is the most universal
and the emptiest of concepts. As such it resists every attempt at definition.
Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any
definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what
he means by it. In this way, that which tP'- ancient philosophers found
continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a
clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he
is charged with an error of method.
At the beginning of our investigation it is not possible to give a detailed
account of the presuppositions and prejudices which are constantly
reimplanting and fostering the belief that an inquiry into Being is unneces-
3 sary. They are rooted in ancient ontology itself, and it will not be possible
to interpret that ontology adequately until the question of Being has been
clarified and answered and taken as a clue-at least, if we are to have
regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed,
and if we are to see whether the categories have been demonstrated in a
way that is appropriate and complete. We shall therefore carry the dis-
cussion of these presuppositions only to the point at which the necessity
for restating the question about the meaning of Being become plain.
There are three such presuppositions.
1. First, it has been maintained that 'Being' is the 'most universal'
concept: Tolllud quod primo cadit sub
apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis
apprehendit. 'An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving
anything which one apprehends as an entity. But the 'universality' of
'Being' is not that of a class or genus. The term 'Being' does not define that
realm of entities which is uppermost when these are Articulated con-
ceptually according to genus and species: oiJT£ To ov ylvos.m The 'univer-
sality' of Being 'transcends' any universality of genus. In medieval ontology
'Being' is designated as a 'transcendens'. Aristotle himself knew the unity of
this transcendental 'universal' as a unitp of analogy in contrast to the
multiplicity of the highest generic concepts applicable to things. With
this discovery, in spite of his dependence on the way in which the
ontological question had been formulated by Plato, he put the problem
of Being on what was, in principle, a new basis. To be sure, even Aristotle
failed to clear away the darkness of these categorial interconnections. In
medieval ontology this problem was widely discussed, especially in the
Thomist and Scotist schools, without reaching clarity as to principles.
And when Hegel at last defines 'Being' as the 'indeterminate immediate'
and makes this definition basic for all the further categorial explications
of his 'logic', he keeps looking in the same direction as ancient ontology, except that he no longer pays heed to Aristotle's problem of the unity of
Being as over against the multiplicity of 'categories' applicable to
things. So if it is said that 'Being' is the most universal concept, this
cannot mean that it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further
discussion. It is rather the darkest of all.
2. It has been maintained secondly that the concept of 'Being' is 4
indefinable. This is deduced from its supreme universality,tv and rightly
so, if de.finitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specijicam. 'Being' cannot
indeed be conceived as an entity; enti non additur aliqua natura : nor can it
acquire such a character as to have the term "entity" applied to it.
"Being" cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can
it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that 'Being' no
longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that 'Being' cannot
have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept
of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its founda-
tions in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a
quite justifiable way of' defining "entities". The indefinability of Being
does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look
that question in the face.
3· Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self-
evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever
one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, 1 some use
is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without
further ado', just as everyone understands "The sky is blue', 'I am merry',
and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which
merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in
any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities-even in any
Being towards entities as entities-there lies a priori an enigma. 2 The very
fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the mean-
ing of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle
to raise this question again.
Within the rangeof basic philosophical concepts-especiallywhen we come
to the concept of 'Being'-it is a dubious procedure to invoke self-evidence,
even if the 'self-evident' (Kant's 'covert judgments of the common reason')3
is to become the sole explicit and abiding theme for one's analytic
'the business of philosophers'.
By considering these prejudices, however, we have made plain not only
that the question of Being lacks an answer, but that the question itself is
obscure and without direction. So if it is to be revived, this means that
we must first work out an adequate way offormulating it.
